



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

In view of the above, and in view of the disproportionate strength of the two nations,—a giant attacking a pigmy,—can we do aught else than call this an unholy, an ignominious war? We do not consider the question of honor, that bugbear of nations. Christ did not consider the question of honor when they came out with sword and staves to take him, but divinely, and in the spirit of peace, said to Peter, "Put up thy sword."

Opportunities come alike to individuals and to nations. Christ's opportunity came, and he used it in behalf of peace and humanity. England's opportunity came,—the opportunity to help in the great cause of arbitration, and later in disarmament, and ultimately in the establishment of peace, perpetual and universal, among the nations of the earth,—but alas! that opportunity is gone, and the mighty has fallen, dragging the garments of white-robed Peace in the dust.

In closing, two points are to be noted: (1) That these statements concerning Parliament are taken from press dispatches. If these are erroneous, and so do injustice, I am sorry. (2) Neither England nor any other nation has, so far as I know, ratified the articles of the Hague Conference, and hence is not bound in a legal sense by these articles; but she is bound by a higher and more sacred bond, namely, responsibility for her influence—an influence that, on the side of peace, might set the nations forward half a century; on the side of war, may sweep many into the abyss of blood and cripple civilization for decades to come.

WICHITA, KAN., Oct. 26.

Why the Alaska Boundary Commission Failed.

The best statement of the Alaska boundary question, from the American point of view, which has yet been given to the public, was that made by Hon. John W. Foster, a member of the Commission, before the National Geographical Society at Washington on November 3. Mr. Foster, reading and expounding the treaty of 1825, said that the territory in dispute had been in the undisputed possession of Russia, and afterwards of the United States, for more than seventy years, or since the treaty of 1825 between Russia and Great Britain. According to this treaty, Russia was to have a continuous strip of territory on the mainland from the extremity of Prince of Wales Island around all the arms of the sea. The strip was to be ten marine leagues wide in all its extent, unless inside that limit a chain of mountains existed which constituted a natural watershed between the two countries. Surveys have established that there exists no such defined watershed. Proof that the territory in question is none of it British is found, he said, in the fact that the Hudson's Bay Company, with the approval of the British and Russian governments, leased of the Russian-American Company in 1839 the very strip now in controversy.

Mr. Foster stated that the British government, for the first time in an official manner, set up its claim of a line near the seaward mountains and the waters of all the inlets of the sea after the meeting of the joint high commission at Quebec, in August of last year. He then referred to the publication by the Canadian government of the protocol of proceedings of that commission.

The protocol shows that, after sessions of several months, the commissioners were unable to agree. In a failure of concurrence as to the language of the treaty of 1825, one of the two methods of adjustment was proposed by the British commissioners. The first was a conventional boundary by which Canada should receive, by session or perpetual grant, Pyramid harbor, on Lynn canal, and a strip of land connecting it with Canadian territory to the northwest, and the remaining boundary line to be drawn in the main, conformable to the contention of the United States. The American commissioners, not being prepared to accept this proposition, the alternative was submitted by the British commissioners of an arbitration of the whole territory in dispute, in conformity with the terms of the Venezuelan arbitration, and, in response to an inquiry from their American colleagues whether the selection of an umpire from the American continent would be considered, the British commissioners replied that they would regard such a selection as most objectionable.

The American commissioners declined the British plan of arbitration, and stated that there was no analogy between the present controversy and the Venezuelan dispute; that in the latter case the occupation of the territory in question had, from the beginning, been followed by the constant and repeated protests and objections of Venezuela, and the controversy was one of long standing; but that in the case of the Alaskan territory there has been a peaceful and undisputed occupation and exercise of sovereignty for more than seventy years, and that no question respecting this occupation and sovereignty had been raised by the British government until the present commission had been created. They challenged their British colleagues to cite a single instance in history where a subject attended with such circumstances had been submitted to arbitration, and in declining the British proposition they proposed the plan of settlement which had been framed by Secretary Olney and Sir Julian Pauncefote in 1897. The treaty which these two distinguished statesmen framed so carefully marked the most advanced stage yet attained for the peaceful settlement in international questions not susceptible of adjustment by diplomatic negotiation. In that convention, drafted with a view to "consecrating by treaty the principle of international arbitration," they provided that all such questions should be submitted to arbitrators and an umpire except territorial claims. They recognized that territorial questions affected so vitally the sovereignty and honor of nations that as to them a different method was necessary, and they provided that these should be submitted to a tribunal of three judges of the highest standing in each country, and that a binding decision could only be rendered by a vote of five of the six judges. The American commissioners embodied this plan in their proposition for the settlement of the Alaskan boundary dispute, with the modification that a binding decision might be rendered by four of the six judges.

This proposition was rejected by the British commissioners, and, no other plan being brought forward, the joint high commission adjourned with the understanding that the boundary question should be referred back to the two governments for further diplomatic negotiations.